[Above: Trucks on shoreline as Monona Terrace construction begins at Law Park in 1995. Photo of a photo in DNR files, Maria Powell]
This piece will be edited in coming days. If you see mistakes or problems, or have something to add, please let me know: mariapowell@mejo.us
“EIS committee members received a report from Steve Carpenter, of the UW-Madison Limnology Center, that outlined questions regarding the project’s effects on fish populations, erosion and runoff. ‘If it is constructed, Monona Terrace will be a high-profile example of lakeshore land use that sends a strong message about Madison’s priorities,’ Carpenter wrote. ‘What are the implications of Monona Terrace for future development in the watershed as a whole?’” Marv Balousek, Wisconsin State Journal, August 5, 1992.
*****
Earlier this year, the City of Madison created a special committee, the Lake Monona Waterfront Ad Hoc Committee which according to Dean Mosiman of the Wisconsin State Journal has chosen three finalists that will “reshape the Lake Monona waterfront between Olin Park and Williamson Street.”
As I described in the first part of this series, “Law Park is a Landfill,” most of the area to be “reshaped” by the chosen consultants is an old City of Madison landfill, created on the lake shoreline from the 1930s to the 1950s –to “make land” for a park, a highway, and a Frank Lloyd Wright-designed civic center.[1],[2] The dump eventually extended up to 300 feet out into the lake and was dubbed Law Park after former Madison Mayor James Law, a champion of the lakeshore extension project elected in 1932. A highway, John Nolen Drive, was built on it in 1953.
Wright proposed building his dream “civic center” at this part of the Monona lakeshore in 1938, in part to help fulfill Nolen’s vision of a “grand esplanade” between the capitol and the lake. But the city rejected it. In 1959, the year he died, Wright again created a rendering of a civic center building for the site, but a state law banning lakefront buildings over 20 feet high—purposely intended to prevent the center–deemed it unbuildable.
But the dream wouldn’t die. In the late 1980s, the city again began considering building Wright’s civic center on the lakeshore, and in 1990, Wright’s 1959 plans were dusted off.[3][4]
After contentious political debates, legal petitions, and organized community opposition (see Part III), the $67.1 million Frank Lloyd Wright Monona Terrace was finally begun in 1995 and completed in 1997, funded by City of Madison hotel room tax and bonds, Dane County, the State of Wisconsin and the collection of private sector contributions.
The Evjue Foundation, charitable arm of the Cap Times, was a big supporter of the center, as was the Wisconsin State Journal. A letter to the State Journal editor on August 3, 2022 highlighted another “crucial ingredient” in getting the center built—the Greater Madison Chamber of Commerce—which then mobilized a network of well-endowed power-players to support the project:
“The State Journal’s otherwise comprehensive series of articles on the 25th anniversary of Monona Terrace omitted a crucial ingredient in the efforts to get the facility built. While the paper correctly noted that in 1990 then-Mayor Paul Soglin campaigned to build the center to help revitalize a struggling Downtown, the story missed an initiative that led the city to this point. More accurately, it was the Greater Madison Chamber of Commerce, chaired by Bob Walton, president of ABS Global, that pushed to resurrect the lingering plan. Walton mobilized a network of supporters including UW-Madison Chancellor Donna Shalala, Morgan Murphy Media executive George Nelson, Wisconsin State Journal editor Bob Spiegel, Chamber of Commerce executive director Bob Brennan, and others. After Mayor Soglin and Gov. Tommy Thompson agreed to support the initiative and the referendum was passed in 1992, construction began two years later.”
How was Monona Terrace approved on a landfill in a lake? Here’s how it started…
In the late 1980s, the city again began exploring building a convention center at or near Law Park. In April 1989, the Nolen Terrace Convention Center Complex was rejected by citizen votes on a city referendum, but in May 1989, Mayor Soglin appointed a “Convention Center Task force” to evaluate available data and site alternatives. Building the civic center Frank Lloyd Wright designed in 1959 at Law Park was again placed on the table. (From 1993 FEIS)
At the time, many people raised concerns about how building the center might affect the lake. DNR surveys in the 1980s had revealed extensive PCBs, mercury, and other toxic metal contamination in Lake Monona sediments. Mercury advisories for Lake Monona fish were issued by DNR in the early 1980s, and in 1987 DNR said large walleyes from Lake Monona should not be eaten at all due to mercury levels.[5] (PCBs were not yet over advisory levels–but this changed in later years when the PCB standards were lowered–made more protective).
[Above, a bucket of panfish caught at the Monona Terrace wall in summer 2022, above the toxics-leaching Law Park Landfill. What levels of mercury and other contaminants are in this fish? Does anyone know? No. Photo-Maria Powell, July 2022]
In the 1980s, when mercury, PCBs and other contaminants in the lakes received a lot of media and regulatory attention, leaking landfills were identified as one of the main sources of mercury. Bernard Saley, an “environmental technologist” for the city health department for 44 years, speculated in a 1987 Capital Times article that “[o]ur many old dumps contain untold amounts of mercury, which also finds its way to the lake.”
Aware of these reports, in May 1990, downtown alder Bert Zipperer told the Wisconsin State Journal that the center would be “environmentally disastrous,” arguing that filling in the lakeshore “could stir up mercury-laden lake bottom and would destroy fish spawning grounds.” He also raised concerns about greenspace and runoff, calling it “a plan to pave more of the lakeshore.”
“Can Anything Else Hurt Lake Monona?” City employee says “no”…
In a July 1990, Wisconsin State Journal piece, “Can Anything Else Hurt Lake Monona?” Lampert Smith interviewed Saley, who at that point was retired. He recalled finding “treasures” (household garbage) floating out into the lake from it when he was growing up. But his attitude about building the center at that point was that so much had already been done to hurt the lake, purportedly in the name of “helping” it (such as dumping tons of pesticides into it over many decades), what difference would more abuse make?
DNR’s water specialist discounted potential negative effects of the proposed center on fish habitat, explaining to Lampert Smith that the site “consists of steeply sloping fill that offers little refuge for fish.” This “steeply sloping fill,” of course, was the old dump.
Managing the contaminated sediments, Lampert wrote, would be challenging because construction on the lakeshore could stir up pollutants in the lake bottom and “broadcast them again through the lake.” The DNR water specialist, however, was confident that “state of the art” strategies would “confine” all the sediments during construction of the center.
Apparently assured by these claims, in August 1990, the Madison Common Council created the 28-member Monona Terrace Commission “to oversee the adaption of Frank Lloyd Wright’s drawings and plans for a meeting place and Civic Center on Lake Monona.” The Commission included appointees from the City of Madison, Dane County and the state.
Wright’s original plan included government offices, public meeting spaces, theaters and other public uses in his dream center—but the city seemed to have a more typical “convention center” in mind. Government workers had also been clamoring for years prior to this for more parking near their offices downtown. So large parking ramps were added to the proposal.
In 1991, state Senate Bill 483 approved state financing for the parking ramp portion of the center. The Wisconsin Department of Administration was deemed the lead agency on the project.
Environmental Impact Statement process
Mosiman’s May 2022 article about the Lake Monona waterfront redesign project said the chosen consultants would craft a plan that would “improve water quality and aquatic habitat.” When Monona Terrace was approved in the 1990s, center proponents and the consultants who wrote the Environmental Impact Statement made the same absurd argument.
How can giant buildings and parking ramps “improve water quality”?
An environmental impact statement (EIS) was required by NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) for the center because it was being proposed on a U.S. navigable waterway (and would also require a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Section 404 permit—more on this in Part III).[6] Typically, the federal EIS process requires the consideration of alternatives to the proposed action (Monona Terrace at Law Park), but in this case the only option considered, as decided by the Monona Terrace Commission, was the 1959 Wright design on Lake Monona.[7]
As the lead agency on the project, the Wisconsin Department of Administration technically led the scoping process to determine the content of the EIS, but the city also played a central role. The final EIS said the City of Madison wasn’t obligated to follow NEPA (or the state counterpart, WEPA), but “insisted that the potential environmental impacts of the Monona Terrace project be fully evaluated and understood” and therefore “conducted a significant amount of scoping of the potential impacts of the project which were used to assist in producing the EIS.”
In 1992 Mayor Soglin appointed a special “Monona Terrace EIS Scoping Committee” to outline questions and environmental issues to be addressed in EIS. This committee met several times with the EIS consultants, Woodward-Clyde. That year the DOA also solicited public comments on the scope of the EIS, and sent a summary of potential impacts compiled by the city and DOA to the DNR, DOT, and the State Historical Society. The DNR held a scoping meeting in fall 1992 with involved state agencies.
On August 5, 1992, the Wisconsin State Journal’s Marv Balousek wrote: “EIS committee members received a report from Steve Carpenter, of the UW-Madison Limnology Center, that outlined questions regarding the project’s effects on fish populations, erosion and runoff. ‘If it is constructed, Monona Terrace will be a high-profile example of lakeshore land use that sends a strong message about Madison’s priorities,’ Carpenter wrote. ‘What are the implications of Monona Terrace for future development in the watershed as a whole?’”
In September 1992, the city’s scoping committee received a preliminary copy of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), which “confirmed the public’s concern about many of the issues that had been outlined in WCC’s original scope of work and highlighted certain areas of special concern,” including: loss of greenspace and undeveloped urban shoreline, bicycle and pedestrian access through the Law Park area, shoreline fishing access, air quality impacts, impacts on the vegetation at Law Park, groundwater impacts from potential disturbances of the fill material at Law Park, nonpoint source pollution impacts from the site, and more.
[Above: What Law Park looked like before Monona Terrace was built. Photo of a photo in DNR files, Maria Powell]
Common Council approves Monona Terrace “provided there will be no significant adverse environmental impact on Lake Monona”
Community debates about the project continued. Mainstream environmentalists supported the center, while grassroots and conservation groups vehemently opposed it. In an October 1992, Wisconsin State Journal article, Caryl Terrell, head of the Sierra Club state chapter, and also a member of the Plan Commission who chaired the committee that supervised the Environmental Impact Statement for the project, expressed effusive support. “Many of my concerns as an environmentalist could be met by building Monona Terrace” which she felt would encourage compact development and reduce urban sprawl and also serve as a model for controlling storm water drainage and non-point source pollution.” (Did it? See Part III) “I’m quite excited that such a building might be added to the downtown.”
But Donald Hammes from the Dane County Conservation League said “his group opposes the center because its impact on the lake and shoreline hasn’t been adequately studied, it could be detrimental to fish habitat, and it probably will encourage more development along the lake shore.” He said the costs were too high—“not the economic costs, but the costs of enjoying the lake and lakeshore.”
These public concerns notwithstanding, the center narrowly passed a city-wide referendum in November 1992. The question put before Madison voters was: “Shall the City of Madison construct the Frank Lloyd Wright Monona Terrace Community and Convention Center at Law Park at a total cost not to exceed $63.5 million in 1992 dollars (as adjusted by the U.S. All Urban Consumer Price Index), provided there will be no significant adverse environmental impact on Lake Monona.” [8] (highlights added)
And what did city leaders believe would provide proof of “no significant adverse environmental impact”? The Environmental Impact Statement, paid for by city funds, but written by a consulting firm that community members believed had significant conflicts of interest. [9]
Public comments on the Draft EIS
Members of the public and DNR staff who commented on the Draft EIS raised a range of excellent questions and concerns following its release. The comments were summarized in the Final EIS.
Tom Dawson, the Public Intervenor at the time, commented that the center must be in compliance with the Public Trust Doctrine. Other commenters, including DNR staff, also asked that the Public Trust Doctrine issues be addressed in the EIS.
Woodward-Clyde responded to Dawson’s comment in the FEIS as follows: “A comprehensive legal analysis of the Public Trust Doctrine, and the WDNR’s changing interpretation of that Doctrine, is beyond the scope of this EIS. In any case, the state legislature has approved the project based upon the original legislation creating the “dock line” and its more recent funding of the project. Also, in 1956 the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that a predecessor proposal (a much more ambitious proposal than the Monona Terrace Project) was consistent with the public trust. Madison v State, 1 Wis 2d 252 (1956).” (See this document for more on this.)
Many citizens and DNR officials brought up concerns about effects on water quality, air quality, noise, subsurface (groundwater) effects, loss of greenspace and vegetation, and more.
Ron Shutvet, a citizen with years of engineering and hydrogeology experience, said the center would cause increased runoff of petroleum products and salt, the loss of lake habitat would result in a reduction of Lake Monona fish reproductive capacities, the pilings would be subject to corrosion and high repair costs, greenspace would be reduced by 3.7 acres, and more.
Fishing advocates and DNR staff raised questions about impacts on the fishery and fishing access. Don Hammes from the Yahara Fisherman’s Club said he opposed the project because lake and shore impacts were not adequately addressed, more sampling was needed, and the project would lead to more shoreline development. Alan Schwoegler of the Yahara Fishing Club raised concerns about loss of public fishing access, handicap fishing access, lake level impacts on fish spawning and adverse impacts on loon use of the lake.
DNR Area Fish Manager Scott Stewart wrote that that although the lake wide impacts on the fish populations will not be measurable, “the loss of 1.5 acres of habitat is significant.”
[Below: People fishing at “the wall” at Monona Terrace in July 2022. Photo-Maria Powell]
Harold Meier, the DNR’s Southern District Environmental Impact Coordinator, submitted many comments and questions. “In 1979,” he wrote, “divers reported leachate from the Law Park fill site below water level. If this is the case, will the project affect movement into lake?” He also noted that the project would result in the “permanent loss of 1.5 acres of fish habitat.”[10] On fishing access, he said “DNR’s position is that fishing access to the lake is essential and must be continued after completion of a project. The area is heavily used for fishing—especially by ‘less fortunate.’”[11]
None of these public and agency commenters, however, saw the contaminant data Woodward-Clyde gathered after the DEIS was released, which was included in the Final EIS. Some of that is described next.
Woodward-Clyde’s Final Environmental Impact Statement
Woodward-Clyde’s Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), released in August 1993, discounted or dismissed most of the concerns raised–and at the same time, shared concerning contaminant data publicly for the first time.
Consultants began the report’s water quality section by noting that “Madison’s lakes have been extensively studied over the past several decades.” They summarized past data showing that lake water quality—based on trophic status, chlorophyll-a levels, and phosphorus concentrations–was abyssmal since 1975, and sodium and chloride levels were increasing.
Further, referring to the a 1989 DNR report discussed above, consultants noted that “[m]oderate to high levels of metals, such as mercury, lead, zinc, and arsenic have been reported in both the bottom sediments of tributary streams to Lake Monona and in the lake’s bottom sediments.”
Following the release of the Draft EIS, in January 1993 Woodward- Clyde tested relatively shallow sediments at three locations near the proposed center site. Their findings, they wrote, “confirm that the metal concentrations off of Law Park are in the same range or somewhat less than the metal concentrations in other parts of the lake.”[12]
The implication was that because similar levels of metals were found elsewhere in the lake, the levels near the center didn’t matter. The consultants did not mention the possibility that some of the metals elsewhere in the lake came from the Law Park landfill in the first place.
Petroleum compounds soak sediments, soils, and shallow groundwater at Law Park
During the metals sampling process, Woodward-Clyde found “evidence of petroleum product was observed in the sediment cores,” so they did a “Diesel Range Organics” (DRO) analysis—a general analysis that assesses petroleum compounds found in diesel fuels or oils. DRO compounds were found at significant levels at two of the three cores.
Based on these results, more samples were gathered in March 1993 to further define the makeup of the petroleum contaminants. This time, in addition to DRO, they also analyzed for “Total Recoverable Petroleum Hydrocarbons” (TRPH) (see also here) and 16 types of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), as well as two VOCs. PAH analyses identify specific types of compounds that make up the DRO and TRPH.
The FEIS summarized the results. “Analysis of the sediment indicates that the top layers of sediment contain the highest concentrations of petroleum compounds…primarily composed of diesel (DRO) and heavier oils (TRPH). Both sites contained elevated levels of petroleum.”
Not surprisingly, given these results, very high PAH levels were also found in shallow lake sediments—well over existing guidelines. Most of the individual PAH compounds found in the top 14 inches of sediment in two of the three sediment sampling locations were well above the “effects range-medium” (ERM) level specified. The ERM concentration is a level above which toxic effects were frequently or always observed.
Woodward-Clyde also sank six borings along the lakeshore to test soils for TRPH, and found elevated levels at three of them. Significant TRPH levels were also found in two of the shallow groundwater wells beneath these soils (the water table there was only 3.6-4.5 feet deep) in the central part of Law Park where the center would be built. Consequently, consultants tested these groundwater wells further for PAHs.
Wisconsin state statute NR 140 Enforcement Standard (ES) and Preventive Action Limit (PAL) levels at the time were exceeded for benzo(a)pyrene at both wells, and the naphthalene PAL was exceeded at one of them.
The total PAH levels found in lake bed sediments near the proposed site in the 1993 sampling were extremely high: total PAH level at one boring was 64,925 ug/kg, nearly twice the ERM level sited in the FEIS (35,000 ug/kg) and 50,540 ug/kg was found at another boring.[13]
Consultants never tested lake water at any depth near the proposed Monona Terrace site for PAH, metals or other toxic contaminants leaching from the landfill. Fish were also never tested for any of these contaminants.
The petroleum problem was even worse than they knew then
Importantly, significant levels of many other individual PAHs were found in 1993, but at the time benzo(a)pyrene and napthalene were the only two PAHs with groundwater standards, so they were the only two that the FEIS highlighted. Since that time, the science on (and regulatory approach to) PAHs has progressed significantly. EPA and Wisconsin developed standards for several more of the PAHs found in 1993—and many significantly exceeded current EPA and/or state groundwater standards.[14]
Further, since the 1990s, scientists and regulators have recognized the importance of assessing PAHs as a group, not just one at a time. For instance, in 2015, DNR and DHS developed the “Group of 10” approach for assessing a combination of ten PAHs in wastewater effluents. In 2017, the DNR published a “Risk Assessment Approach” for calculating “direct contact” levels for seven PAHs combined when remediating sites under NR700 (remediation and redevelopment program).
The 2017 DNR document also recognizes that PAHs occur in complex mixtures, noting that “[t]he number of compounds comprising the PAH class is unknown, although hundreds of individual PAHs may be present as components of complex mixtures.” The cumulative assessment approach it advises includes seven cPAHs: benzo[a]pyrene, benz[a]anthracene, benzo[b]fluoranthene, benzo[k]fluoranthene, chrysene, dibenz[a,h]anthracene, and indeno[1,2,3-cd]pyrene. Napthalene compounds are addressed separately.
Also, a growing number of studies show that PAHs can be transformed in various environmental contexts, and can interact with other chemicals and metals to become more toxic and mobile.[15]
As far as we know, PAH levels have not been tested in Lake Monona shoreline sediments since 1993.
[Below: Young man showing off his catch at Monona Terrace in July 2022. What is in this fish?]
Where did all this petroleum come from?
Woodward Clyde said “[t]he most likely petroleum product causing the elevated TRPH measurements,” in soils, “is diesel type oil that may have been dumped in the old landfill.” According to the soil logs of the engineers doing the testing, “oil was noticed at these sites visually and by odor.”[16]
As for sources of petroleum compounds to the lake sediments, the FEIS concluded that “two likely sources of the petroleum found in the sediments are the fill used in Law Park and urban runoff,” noting that “[t]here are storm sewer outfalls located near the west and central sampling sites.”
Another obvious source of petroleum compounds to the fill is the historical stormwater discharges into the lakeshore area from MGE, and the coal ash from MGE layered over the garbage and other wastes brought to the landfill from the 1930s to the 1950s. Interestingly, however, Woodward Clyde carefully avoided mentioning MGE, or even fly ash generally, even though many of the boring logs in DNR files mention encountering “possible fly ash” and cinders (a type of fly ash), and the community was well aware that MGE’s ash went to the landfill.[17]
Woodward-Clyde dismisses most concerns: “No measurable impacts”!
Woodward-Clyde dismissed most concerns submitted by the public and DNR staff about potential negative environmental impacts with vague assurances, most unsupported by any evidence. Ironically, the report repeatedly said potential impacts were “not measurable” (and then never attempted to measure them).
The EIS admitted that “The site is hydrologically connected with Lake Monona. The groundwater is likely interconnected with Lake Monona. Pollutants in the fill have been available to the Lake Monona environment for the past 30 years.”
But flying in the face of the sparse contaminant data the report included, consultants dismissed concerns about toxic pollutants leaching from the landfill. Without any evidence, they claimed that the wastes put in the landfill were not toxic. “During the period when the City was routinely dumping waste materials into Lake Monona to create the Law Park area, toxic compounds that are found in household products today were not commonly available. No such substances have been reported in the fill.” But of course, they hadn’t tested any of the wastes in the landfill, which included much more than “household products.”
The phrase “there will not be a measurable long-term impact” was repeated numerous times. Most pollution impacts consultants mentioned were then deemed to be minimal or irrelevant, usually by comparing them to other pollution sources, which were already significant and, they argued, would dwarf those caused by the center (another well-known, ridiculous polluter trope–other sources are bigger, therefore mine don’t matter!).
These claims also echoed those of retired city employee Bernard Saley in 1990–the lake is already so polluted, what’s a little more? Woodward Clyde wrote: “This determination is based on the comparison of the expected nonpoint source pollutant loads from the site compared to Lake Monona’s over-all pollutant load.”
In the section on “potential impacts on Lake Monona’s water quality as a result of the proposed action,” consultants concluded that “there will not be a measurable long-term impact on the lake’s trophic status, sediment quality, chloride/sodium concentrations, or bacterial levels due to the proposed action.”
Then the document went on to compare the nonpoint source pollution caused by the proposed center—which they said was “potential runoff from the parking garage and other newly paved areas”—to the existing pollution already entering the lake from other sources. Meanwhile, the construction runoff from the center would have “a negligible impact on the entire lake,” the FEIS argued, though it might have short-term localized impacts on the near-shore lake bed off Law Park during construction, such as increases in turbidity.
But the benefits of the center, the EIS suggested, would outweigh these impacts. “It is expected that the Convention Center,” the FEIS stated in this section, “will attract additional public usage of the Monona Terrace area, causing an increase in the public awareness of the water quality of Lake Monona.”
The argument that water quality will be improved by increased public usage–thereby increasing public awareness of water quality–is also being touted by proponents of the Monona shoreline re-development now, in 2022. Neither Woodward-Clyde nor proponents of the current shoreline redevelopment plan explain how this will improve water quality.
What about the pilings?
The DNR’s 1992 guidance document on exemptions for building over landfills (see Appendix for more details) raises concerns about pilings driven through them to support buildings.
Since it was being built over a landfill in a lake, Monona Terrace required pilings—1,725 were placed under the building.
The FEIS couldn’t avoid the pilings issue. It admitted that “the action of driving pilings into the lake bed will disturb and re-suspend sediments on the lake bed,” which have (contrary to data reported elsewhere) “relatively low levels of heavy metals and PCBs.” It recognized that “elevated levels of petroleum product have been found in the sediment within the proposed construction area” and that pile driving activity “will likely release some of this petroleum and cause the lighter petroleum to rise to the lake surface.”
Remarkably, the FEIS then assured, with no specifics to support it, that “[t]he quantity of petroleum released in this manner will be very small and is not expected to cause direct harm to fish or plant life,” though it “could cause negative aesthetic impacts.”
The DNR’s guidance also prohibited water supply wells within 1,200 feet of the limits of the waste, and noted that “water supply regulations prohibit the construction of a water supply well within 1,200 feet of a waste disposal facility.” Well 17 (at the far south end of Hancock Street) was already in place in 1966, well within 1200 feet of the waste limits—the eastern end of the landfill is within less than half of that distance, about 600 feet or so.
Driving pilings down through a contaminated landfill can also create pathways for this contamination to move down into groundwater.
The FEIS didn’t address potential impacts to groundwater or Madison Municipal Well #17 (this is discussed in later parts to this story).
EIS estimated increases in sediments, phosphorus, and lead (but no other contaminants). But not to worry–other sources are much larger!
Potential water quality impact analyses were limited to estimates of additional sediments, phosphorus, and metals (only lead) from the center. Presumably the city scoping committee made this decision. “The parameters of sediment, phosphorus, and metals were selected for the analysis of potential long-term water quality impacts, because these parameters have historically been the pollutants of most concern, and because these parameters have been the most extensively studied.”**
Yet again the EIS fell back on the old trope—there’s already so much pollution there, any estimated additional pollution won’t matter. As for sediments, phosphorus, and lead (not any of the other metals known to be in sediments there, which weren’t addressed), it admitted that “[a]lthough the estimated changes are large, the actual numbers are small relative to the lake’s annual pollutant load” and “would not result in a measurable impact on the overall condition of Lake Monona or on the downstream water resources.” See table, above right, from FEIS.
Explaining the increased phosphorus levels, for example, consultants explained that “the “before” condition for phosphorus runoff from the site is 11.3 pounds per year and the “after” condition may be 16.1 pounds per year. This is compared with a total phosphorus load to Lake Monona from all sources of over 27,400 pounds per year. The change in phosphorus represents an increase of less than 0.02 percent of the lake’s over-all phosphorus loading. This change would not result in a measurable impact on the overall condition of Lake Monona or on the downstream water resources.”**
While downplaying this significant estimated increase of phosphorus resulting from the center’s construction, the EIS highlighted PAH and other pollutants coming from other sources. “Runoff from urban areas and parking areas are known to contain petroleum products (polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons-PAH) antifreeze, and other materials,” it said. “Although no pollutant loading figures for PAHs have been calculated for the entire Lake Monona watershed, monitoring in the City of Madison has shown PAH levels occasionally exceed water quality standards in the storm sewers…”
**Phosphorus has been the main (and often only) contaminant of concern assessed by Madison and Dane County agencies, because of its impact on algal growth. For unknown reasons, they completely ignore nitrogen compounds, which play key roles in lake weed growth. The FEIS also did not mention nitrogen. Reflecting this Harold Meier, DNR Southern District Environmental Impact Coordinator (cited above), submitted this comment on the DEIS: “Nitrogen (ammonium) is the primary limiting nutrient for macrophytes, not phosphorus.”
It is well-documented that nitrogen compounds leach from landfills.
Contaminated sediments may be “scoured” into deep lake areas—but no biological or ecological effects!
“Lake scouring” was another impact the FEIS recognized, but then minimized as only potentially occurring in “unusual” circumstances. “Wave erosion and scour of bottom sediments underneath the overhang of the Convention Center,” it predicted, would increase as a result of the project. Under “the unusual condition of a ten-year high lake level combining with a ten-year high wave height…it is expected that scouring of the lake bed sediments will increase over natural conditions.”
The only impacts on the lake from this scouring, consultants assured, would be short-term increased turbidity near the center and turbidity off-shore as scoured sediments were re-suspended and transported to other parts of the lake.
They casually noted that “[t]his short-term impact may also result in the release of lighter petroleum products that will float to the surface of the lake and dissipate with time,” but “[t]his short-term impact is not expected to have any measurable long-term impact on the lake water quality of biologic activity in the lake. The impact, if any, will be a brief aesthetic impact.”
A longer term impact, the FEIS predicted “will occur when the re-suspended sediments are transported and deposited in deeper areas of the lake.” This was also deemed unimportant. “Since the near-shore sediments are, by most measures, less contaminated than the sediments in the deeper areas of the lake, it is not expected that the new deposits that may occur as the result of the possible scouring events would have any measurable impact on the lake or its biologic communities.”
Further, the scouring wouldn’t go on forever, but would continue “until enough sediment had been scoured and redeposited in deeper portions of the lake, and a steady state or equilibrium condition was established…”
The consultants didn’t clarify or support these dubious claims with evidence.
Everything will be under control!
“Nonpoint source runoff from the completed project can be minimized through the use of best management practices,” the FEIS assured. The City of Madison would be required to follow local, state and federal stormwater laws, which along with best management practices would reduce nonpoint source pollution by 80 to 90 percent for sediment and metals 40-60 percent for phosphorus, 80-90 percent for oil and petroleum, and 75 percent for sediment runoff. (These very ambitious goals were later reduced considerably).
Consultants admitted that pile driving “will re-suspend sediments in the vicinity of the pile driving” and while “this short-term re-suspension is not expected to have any measurable impact on Lake Monona’s overall water quality or negatively impact the lake’s biotic communities, such re-suspension could be contained with industry-standard silt curtains.”
What about all the petroleum compounds in the sediments and landfill the pilings would be driven through? “The re-suspension of lake bed sediments may also result in short-term release of lighter petroleum product, which will appear as a sheen on the lake surface.”
But again, consultants assured that this was not a big concern. “This re-suspension will be short-term and is not expected to have any measurable impact on the lake’s water quality or biotic communities.” And, “even this impact can be contained by the use of sorptive booms around the pile driving area. These booms would contain and adsorb any petroleum product that may be released from the sediment during the pile driving activity.”
No impact on the fishery!
After having dismissed most water quality impacts as “not measurable,” or not important relative to other contaminant sources and impacts, the FEIS drew the same conclusion about impacts to the fishery. First it listed “potential impacts to the fishery,” including: “physical disturbance of shallow water, localized increase in sedimentation and water turbidity during the construction phase, alteration of fish habitat associated with the portion of the Convention Center that will be constructed over the lake, and possible increased wave erosion of the lake bottom under the overhang of the Convention Center.”
But yet again the report proceeded to render these problems as inconsequential. “Based on the available data and the analysis…it appears that the proposed project will have no measurable impact upon Lake Monona’s overall sport fish population, year class size, or reproduction capability.”
Following this dismissal, consultants outlined impacts, such as “permanent displacement of much of the fish use of the immediate area of the proposed building both during construction and post construction,” “elevated turbidity during construction will interfere with the ability of sight feeding fish to forage for food,” noise and vibration driving fish away, construction sediment runoff, elimination of fish habitat under the center, noise and vibration driving fish away, and construction runoff (sediment) impacting the local, near shore area.
The lake under the center, consultants explained, “will for the most part cease to be utilized by fish” and will be “void of light” but this “will not have measurable long-term affects (sic) on the fishery in the lake as a whole” because the center would only cover about 0.05 of Lake Monona’s open water. The loss of spawning habitat under the center, similarly, “will not have a measurable impact to the lake’s overall fish populations” since it is less than 2.5% of the spawning habitat protected by DNR’s Aquatic plant management program. The fish, consultants assured, “will utilize other available areas” for spawning.
Scouring of lake bed sediment, “will not further impact the area under the building in relation to habitat use…since the fish habitat under the building will be eliminated.” The scoured sediments “will likely move down slope into the deeper areas of the lake. Since the most important fish spawning habitat in Lake Monona is located along the shoreline in areas where the water depth is generally less than ten feet, movement of bottom sediment from underneath the Convention Center to deeper portions of the lake will not impact the shallow spawning areas.”
The 1,725 steel pilings would be subject to corrosion, but they would be “cathodically protected” (electrically charged) to prevent this. Pile driving would be timed to avoid prime spawning period for fish, and extra construction erosion control measures would be implemented.
What about PAHs and other toxic contaminants in the landfill? How might the pilings affect their movement? “Although fill in the project area exists above natural soils the original lake bed, the fill and the natural soils are likely hydraulically interconnected. Thus, foundation pilings which penetrate the fill soils into natural soils will not alter the existing groundwater flow regime and will not increase the likelihood that contaminants that may be present in the fill will migrate into the lake. Trenching for utility lines and other services could have a local impact on the groundwater flow patterns. It the trenches are filled with gravel or other course material, the groundwater flow will follow the path of least resistance. This means that, in some cases, groundwater flow toward Lake Monona in Law park, will occur along the utility trench lines rather than as part of the current groundwater flow pattern.”
In a later section, the EIS admitted that “During the construction phase there will likely be unavoidable sediment contributions and short-term water turbidity to the local area of the Lake along the proposed site. The pile driving activity will cause turbid conditions and some release of petroleum product contained within the lake bed sediments.”
What about people who eat fish caught at the landfill?
Fish were not tested for any contaminants; the FEIS didn’t even mention this issue.
Impacts on shoreline fishing will be discussed in a later part to this story…
(Right: Milwaukee man fishing at “the wall” at Monona Terrace in July 2022. Photo-Maria Powell.]
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DNR: Removing wastes from a landfill in a lake is “not practicable,” and “no downgradient users” will be affected–so “no further action” needed!
On August 12, 1993, around the time the FEIS was released, DNR’s District Director James Huntoon wrote to Mr. George Lightbourn of the Department of Administration.
The groundwater data DOA had submitted to DNR (presumably the same data in the FEIS), Huntoon noted, showed “elevated concentrations” of PAHs beneath the site, with two of them (naphthalene and benzo(a)pyrene) above the enforcement standard in NR 140. “While we would typically require levels such as these to be actively addressed through some type of remedial effort, the fact that this site was once a landfill for the city alters that approach.” The rule, he went on, “essentially allows some degradation of groundwater quality beneath these types of facilities as long as the contamination does not migrate beyond the design management zone, which is a point some given distance out from the waste boundary, nor impact other points of groundwater use.” (emphasis added). The “design management zone,” he continued, “would extend approximately 250 feet beyond that point, or out into the lake itself.”
“No downgradient groundwater users who might be possibly impacted by this contamination”
Huntoon continued: “Given that this is an old landfill site, with the fill actually extending out into Lake Monona, source control measures such as waste removal would not be practicable. Since the lake would also more than likely be the groundwater discharge point from this site, collection of groundwater data from a downgradient location would require a well through the lake bed at some distance from shore, which also does not seem practicable. Since there are no downgradient groundwater users who might possibly be impacted by this contamination, we have decided that further downgradient data would not affect our decisions on a need for additional work. Therefore, the Department has decided that no further action is necessary, other than the installation and sampling of additional wells.”(emphasis added) [18]
“The borings which were performed in the lake bed itself also detected some elevated concentrations of PAHs,” he added. “In discussing this data with staff from our Water Resource Management (WRM) program, we discovered that a study conducted in the summer of 1989 identified contamination in lake bed sediments throughout various parts of Lake Monona and Monona Bay. While this study focused on a different set of contaminant parameters, it does indicate a more extensive problem than just in the area of the convention center.”[19]
Like the consultants, Huntoon was suggesting that the contamination near the center doesn’t matter because sediments in the whole lake are contaminated. He indicated that DNR staff would do some follow up lake sediment sampling and sediment sampling along the shoreline, but it’s not clear whether this was ever done.
DNR leaders are satisfied, City Council passes resolution that the center will “have no significant adverse environmental impact on Lake Monona”
Several elected officials had been raising questions about the effects of Monona Terrace on the lakes and fisheries, but they were assured by DNR that everything was under control.
On November 5, 1993, DNR Secretary George Meyer wrote to Dane County Supervisor Mary Sara and assured her that the DNR was very satisfied with the EIS. Though “not all of our concerns were addressed in the final EIS,” he told Supervisor Sara, the DNR would be “conducting some additional sampling of our own” and still needed “to resolve the issue of mitigation for the effect of the project on the fisheries and shoreline fishing opportunities.” He added that mitigation could perhaps be addressed in the Army Corps of Engineers 404 permit, which had not been issued yet (see later parts of the story).
The Madison Common Council (with many alders likely influenced by the Chamber of Commerce behind the scenes), was also apparently largely satisfied with the FEIS (well, with some giant caveats–see below).
Again, the November 3, 1992 resolution question answered affirmatively by the majority of Madison voters was: “Shall the City of Madison construct the Frank Lloyd Wright Monona Terrace Community and Convention Center at Law Park…provided there will be no significant adverse environmental impact on Lake Monona.”
After reviewing the FEIS, apparently assured by its repeated “no measurable effects” claims, on Nov. 16, 1993, the Council passed another resolution: “NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Common Council finds that the construction of the Monona Terrace Convention and Community Center will have no significant adverse environmental impact on Lake Monona.”
The resolution, however, was contingent on 13 items requiring stormwater reduction actions and other mitigation recommendations. In other words, the statement “will have no significant adverse environmental impact on Lake Monona” was based on mitigation measures that might (or might not) be implemented in the future.
Also, the very last statement in the resolution was: “BE IT STILL FURTHER RESOLVED that if the Monona Terrace Project receives a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers and an exemption from the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, then the Monona Terrace Project shall comply with all requirements of the permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers and conditions of the exemption required by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.”
Were the measures that would assure “no significant adverse environmental impact on Lake Monona” taken by the city (or anyone) after this? When did the Monona Terrace Project get the official exemption (approval) from DNR to build over the landfill, and what were its conditions? Was the Army Corps of Engineers permit issued, and what requirements were included?
That’s a long story…to be continued in Part III (and beyond).
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Footnotes (Appendix-below footnotes)
[1] The areas further to the west and southwest of Law Park, Olin Park and Alliant Energy Center, are also landfills.
[2] Investigative borings through the landfill in the 1990s found brick, glass, wood, cloth, concrete, newspapers, cinders, coal tar, fly ash, pieces of metal and other “miscellaneous materials” there. One well boring noted encountering a shoe. Several investigators observed and smelled petroleum contamination.
[3] The proposed center would be 200,000 square feet, four stories high, and would include 700 parking slots to help fill a need for parking for city and state government workers
[4] The central part of Law Park was zoned conservancy at some point, according to a Nov. 9. 1993 Woodward-Clyde document.
[5] According to an April 2, 1987 Capital Times article by Daniel Allegretti, “both state and city of Madison official knew at least 15 years prior to this that Lake Monona was seriously contaminated by mercury. They even went so far as to track down its primary sources: major local industries, the University of Wisconsin, leaking landfills and decades of sewage dumping. Despite all the warning signs, however, nothing was done to either eliminate the mercury or monitor its accumulation in fish…” Allegretti reviewed Madison Department of Public Health files, which he said “tell a tale of benign neglect of what is today considered an environmental problem of major proportions. Even today the extent of the problem is not known.”
[6] Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes a program to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States, including wetlands. Activities in waters of the United States regulated under this program include fill for development, water resource projects (such as dams and levees), infrastructure development (such as highways and airports) and mining projects. Section 404 requires a permit before dredged or fill material may be discharged into waters of the United States, unless the activity is exempt from Section 404 regulation (e.g., certain farming and forestry activities).The basic premise of the program is that no discharge of dredged or fill material may be permitted if: (1) a practicable alternative exists that is less damaging to the aquatic environment or (2) the nation’s waters would be significantly degraded. In other words, when you apply for a permit, you must first show that steps have been taken to avoid impacts to wetlands, streams and other aquatic resources; that potential impacts have been minimized; and that compensation will be provided for all remaining unavoidable impacts.
[7] As for the rationale for this single option, the Final EIS says “Based upon review of the failed attempts in the past to develop a convention center in downtown Madison, the availability of Law Park, and the unique and architecturally significant Frank Lloyd Wright design for a facility, the Commission recommended the consideration of only one location and only one design. The proposed Convention Center, the project that is the subject of this EIS, is the adapted 1959 Frank Lloyd Wright design on Lake Monona. The City’s choice of this particular facility grew out of the failed efforts over the past century to develop a convention center in downtown Madison. (FEIS, pg. 2-2) Therefore, the city did not seriously consider any alternatives in deciding to promote the Monona Terrace.” Also, according to the FEIS, Senate Bill 483 “in its specific language, selects the City’s Frank Lloyd Wright Monona Terrace Project as the only alternative that must be studied in this EIS.” (FEIS, pg 9-2).
[8] Woodward-Clyde agreed to do a number of additional investigations for the Final EIS (FEIS), including some limited lake bed sediment, soil/soil gas and groundwater analyses at the proposed center site, and analyzing the potential that “lake bed scouring” could occur once the structure was built. The consultants would also further analyze impacts on aesthetics (views), loss of park and greenspace, noise, and socioeconomic impacts.
[9] Some members of the community felt strongly that there was a conflict of interest with the consultants, Woodward-Clyde. A commenter on the DESI wrote: “There is a conflict of interest with the consultant in this project because of the identification of EWI Engineering on a contract between the City of Madison and Taliesin Architecture to provide soil testing services.” WCC answer: “EWI Engineering (acquired by Woodward-Clyde Consultants in April of 1992) is not under a written or verbal agreement with the Architectural firm (Taliesin) for work related to this project. WCC has not performed any work related to this project for the Architect. Thus, no conflict of interest exists.”
[10] The EIS also argued that the extended fishing season from the heat leakage from the building would outweigh the loss of 1.5 acres of fish habitat. Meier questioned this comparison (check).
[11] Interestingly, Meier also questioned only analyzing phosphorus in the EIS, noting that “Nitrogen (ammonium) is the primary limiting nutrient for macrophytes, not phosphorus.” Woodward Clyde said “Phosphorus is analyzed because it is the nutrient with the most information available and because of its importance in supporting algae growth in Lake Monona.”
[12] It’s not clear if their testing was at the right depths to make appropriate comparisons to the DNR results.
[13] The Monona Bay DNR presentation (from some time in the 2000s) used an MEC of 12,205 ug/kg for total PAH. Other more recent studies point to a range of guidelines—see here.
[14] The Wisconsin DHS has established drinking water standards for five of the most studied PAHs: – 3,000 parts per billion (ppb), Benzo(a)pyrene – 0.2 ppb, Benzo(b)fluoranthene – 0.2 ppb, Fluoranthene – 400 ppb, Fluorene – 400 ppb
[15] From Wikipedia: “Abiotic degradation in the atmosphere and the top layers of surface waters can produce nitrogenated, halogenated, hydroxylated, and oxygenated PAHs; some of these compounds can be more toxic, water-soluble, and mobile than their parent PAHs.” See here and here (there are more studies, follow related links).
[16] Below the upper foot of soil, boring logs listed “various material” including clay, sand, possible foundry sand, concrete, wood, glass, brick, gravel, cinders, cloth, paper, and pieces of metal.” They encountered large slabs of concrete, causing drilling problems.
[17] MGE was one of the strong supporters of Monona Terrace; perhaps Woodward Clyde didn’t want to offend this powerhouse supporter? Also, building Monona Terrace was a great way to cover up their (and the city’s) landfill mess.
[18] He referred to discussions in May about installing additional upgradient groundwater monitoring wells next to the rail corridor “to get a better picture as to what background groundwater quality may be” and to determine if “the contamination identified originated from the old landfill or from some other off-site source.”
[19] Purportedly, no sediments would be removed in constructing the center, since it would be built on pilings (this is incorrect, see Fleischli letters). Precautionary steps would be required to limit the resuspension of contaminated sediments and restrict “dispersal of suspended solids.” Staff suggested silt curtains throughout the water column while driving the pilings.
[20] Before NR 500 was developed there were “no explicit restrictions” on developing on top of closed landfills, and although the department could impose restrictions, “in practice the issue was seldom addressed.”
[21] This guidance was just that—a guidance. NR 500 was updated in 1997.
Appendix: State environmental regulations on developments over landfills
In the 1980s and ‘90s, according to the DNR, abandoned landfills were increasingly being targeted for development, especially in rapidly developing urban areas.
Following the issuance of the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund) in 1980, Wisconsin DNR promulgated its landfill regulations (NR500-520) in 1988. The NR500 code passed in 1988 placed explicit prohibitions on building on abandoned landfills.
However, the code allowed exemptions if the department “believes that a particular site does not pose a threat or if engineering controls can be implemented to prevent harm to the public and environment.”[20]
According to the DNR’s December 1992 “Guidelines for Review of Requests for Exemptions to Construct on Abandoned Landfills,” the development pressure on landfills was increasingly challenging the department because: little information was available on volumes and types of wastes disposed in old landfills, developers tended to “resent the longer review periods imposed by the Department,” and “[o]wners of property and their consultants typically have little knowledge of solid waste management principles and of the risks associated with building on landfills. Once apprised of the risks, many also seem to be largely indifferent.” Also, “in a number of recent cases, engineering controls required by the Department as conditions of the grants of exemption have been omitted entirely or seriously misconstructed.”
Based on these challenges, the DNR proposed that “the standards for receiving an exemption must be tightened so as to ensure that the public and the environment are protected.” (emphasis added)
A section in the guidance on “concerns regarding construction on abandoned landfills” included: methane collection in buildings, toxic gases collecting in structures, disturbance of the landfill cap, utility lies acting as conduits for gas and leachate, dewatering problems, worker exposure, and settlement problems.
“Settlement problems” can occur because landfill wastes settle unevenly, especially if development places weight over them. This can in turn cause foundations to crack and allow landfill gases into buildings and/or make the building unsafe due to structural instability. Utility lines can crack or break, resulting in contamination of the water supply, and pilings used to stabilize buildings over landfills can create conduits for gas and/or leachate to enter buildings and “can completely penetrate the waste and extend into a non-contaminated aquifer, possibly allowing contaminants to migrate into the lower, unaffected aquifer.”
The guidance prohibited water supply wells within 1,200 feet of the limits of the waste, and noted that “water supply regulations prohibit the construction of a water supply well within 1,200 feet of a waste disposal facility.”
Since it was being built over a landfill in a lake, Monona Terrace required pilings—1,725 were placed under the building. It’s not clear when the above “water supply regulations” were put into place, but Well 17 was already in place in 1966, well within 1200 feet of the waste limits—the eastern end of the landfill is within less than half of that distance.
The guidance said DNR would review requests for exemptions and outlined information needed to complete the exemption request. This included detailed hydrogeologic information, type of waste disposed of at the site, depth and horizontal extent of the waste, concentration of methane, and “waste characterization tests to determine whether any waste may be classified as hazardous, and also its basic physical and chemical properties.”
The guidance listed “criteria for grants of exemption”: 1) no methane problem; 2) no settlement problem; 3) Prevent surface waters from infiltrating to wastes and creating leachate. Under “No settlement problem,” the guidance mentioned the use of “specialized foundations,” such as pilings, advising to “Keep in mind, however, that the use of pilings can create conduits for gas and leachate and that even a floating foundation requires that differential settlement be maintained within specific tolerances.” (The third criteria, of course, was a moot point for Monona Terrace because it was being built over a landfill that was already in the lake.)
The guidance concluded with: “Construction on abandoned landfills can create many health and safety problems and should therefore be avoided whenever possible. Any development which does occur must be considered very carefully to ensure that all safety and environmental risks have been avoided.”[21]
On May 28, 1993, DNR’s Southern District Director James Huntoon sent a letter to the George Lightbourn at the Department of Administration outlining information the agency wanted to review for the exemption request. The 1992 guidance was attached to the letter.
